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Chapter 11
Pensions in Brazil: Reaching the Limits of
Parametric Reform in Latin America
Milko Matijascic and Stephen J. Kay
Brazil is an outlier with respect to pension reform in Latin America.
Countries throughout the region, including Southern Cone neighbors
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, have introduced structural reforms that
include private individual investment accounts designed to complement or
replace state-run PAYGO systems (see Matijascic and Kay 2006). Brazil has
instead engaged in parametric reforms. Inspired by the Swedish and Italian
reforms, Brazil has instituted DCs without the funded accounts seen in the
rest of the region.
The history of social security in Brazil is also distinct from that of its
neighbors. Among other factors, social security is codified in the 1988
Constitution, its broad coverage and benefits structure make it the single
largest national antipoverty program in the region, and a significant private
pension fund sector had already developed even in the absence of man-
dated individual accounts. Although a few political leaders have favored
private accounts (most notably ex-President Cardoso), individual accounts
never received much political traction in Brazil, in part because moving
to a private-funded system while still honoring commitments in the public
system would entail prohibitively high transition costs, equal to 201 percent
of GDP (ECLAC 2006: 127).
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution includes several measures that universalized
and raised social security benefits. It doubled rural pensions, recalculated
pension levels to make up for value eroded by inflation, introduced index-
ing against inflation, and made the minimum wage the minimum pension
level. It also permitted social security to be financed through taxes on gross
revenues, financial transactions, and net profit. While codifying benefit
levels in the Constitution provides greater legal protection for beneficiaries,
these benefits have proven difficult to finance, especially because funds
earmarked for social security have been used to fund a range of nonsocial-
security-related public expenditures. Furthermore, because benefit levels
Opinions and errors are solely those of the authors and do not reflect views of the institutions
with whom the authors are affiliated.
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are defined in the Constitution, revisions require a constitutional amend-
ment, which in turn requires a three-fifths majority in the Chamber of
Deputies.
This chapter describes Brazil’s social security system and the highly con-
tentious process of reform, and concludes with an assessment of current
policy dilemmas.
From Social Insurance to Social Security
Retirement coverage in Brazil harks back to the colonial period, when in
1554 the Santa Casa de Misericórdia in Santos first provided pensions.
After the installation of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808,
coverage was provided to select civil servants. This pattern of segmented
coverage endured until the early twentieth century. In 1919, after the
formation of the International Labor Bureau, accident insurance was pro-
vided via mandatory contributions. These developments mirrored those in
neighboring countries and represented the beginnings of what eventually
became identified as social security.
Later milestones include the 1923 creation of the Caixas de Aposenta-
dorias e Pensões (CAPs, or Pension and Retirement Funds), which were
DB programs funded with contributions from employees, employers, and
the state that provided coverage for disability, illness, premature death, and
time of service. In 1933 CAPs began to be replaced by the Institutos de
Aposentadorias e Pensões (IAPs, or Retirement Pension Institutes), which
ceased to exist in 1966, when they were centralized. The basic institutional
characteristics of Brazilian pension programs since 1923 are outlined in
Table 11-1.
Social security legislation since 1919, summarized in Table 11-2, reflects
increasing state intervention, centralization, and universalization of cover-
age for workers in more precarious occupations—all of which was foreseen
in 1945 but not enacted until the early 1970s. Initial regulations were tightly
linked to Brazil’s labor code, but over time most elements began to be seen
as social rights and took on their own juridical identity.
The impact of the 1988 Constitution, which specified the parameters
of social protection, is critical to understanding how events unfolded in
subsequent years. There was considerable controversy over specific lan-
guage in the Constitution that critics viewed as inefficient and financially
onerous but that supporters viewed as necessary to reduce Brazil’s peren-
nial inequality. For the first time, universal coverage guaranteeing equal
treatment of all workers was enacted. In addition, rural workers were given
the right to retire five years before urban workers, and women have the
right to retire five years before men or with five fewer years of service. A
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Table 11-1 Institutional Structure of Social Security (1923–2006)
Structure CAPs 1923–31 IAPs 1931–67 RGPS since 1967
Financing Collective capitalization
and DB
— PAYGO and DB
Benefits Uniform By labor category Uniform
Management Sponsoring firms State —
Coverage Authorized firms Select
occupations
Universal (after
1974)
Civil servants By institution IPASE IPASE (until 1978)
and by statute
Regulation Finance Ministry Labor Ministry Social Security
Ministry
Source: MPAS (2002).
Notes: RGPS = Regime Geral de Previdência Social, or General Social Security Regime; IPASE
= Instituto de Previdencia e Assistencia dos Servidores do Estado, or State Employees Social
Security Institute.
critical feature of the pension system since the Constitution was enacted is
the 1991 linkage of pensions and the minimum wage.
To confer credibility on these new reforms, the government created the
Social Security Budget (Orçamento de Seguridade Social, or OSS) and
funded it from multiple sources—including payroll taxes, taxes on earnings
and profits, and, beginning in 1993, a tax on financial transactions. The
purpose of the OSS was to fund pensions, health care, and social assistance.
This lumping together of all these issues under a new legal definition
of security (seguridade, in Portuguese) could presumably insulate social
spending from political interference by the Finance Ministry and provide
policymakers with resources to better address social issues.
During the 1990s, Brazil instituted a number of parametric reforms while
its neighbors largely engaged in structural reform. The process is by no
means complete, and it is difficult to forecast what reforms will look like a
generation from now, or even when current impasses in the reform process
will be overcome.
A Process of Continuing Reform
Legislation since 1989 reflects a search for the means to improve revenue
collection and achieve greater fiscal balance, while at the same time extend-
ing coverage, especially for those segments of the population in the greatest
need (recent legislation is summarized in Table 11-3). Higher revenue was
achieved through new taxes and higher tax rates.
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Table 11-2 Principal Social Security Legislation (1919–88)
Year Legislation Status
1919 Signature of ILO Convention on accident
insurance (insurance contracts)
Until 1967
1923 Eloy Chaves Law ratified, creating CAPs Until 1966
1931 Labor Ministry created (responsible for social
security)
Until 1974
1940 Minimum wage created—the basis for social
security benefits
Current
1943 Labor laws consolidated, guaranteeing right to a
pension
Current
1945 ISSB created—unified and universalized social
security
Not in effect
1947 Unification of IAPs proposed Not in effect
1952 First statute enacted consolidating civil service
pensions
Current
1953 CAPs incorporated into IAPs Until 1967
1960 LOPS enacted Current
1962 Minimum age for time of service pensions
eliminated
Current
1963 Pensions for rural workers created
(PRORURAL)
Not in effect
1966 IAPs consolidated into INPS Current via INSS
1967 Ministry of Labor and Social Security created Until 1974
1967 Incorporated worker accident insurance into the
INPS, ending insurance contracts
Current via INSS
1971 Pensions for rural workers created
(FUNRURAL)
Until 1988
1974 Created Ministry of Social Security and Social
Assistance
Current
1977 Closed and open pension funds legislated Current
1978 Ended IPASE; distinguished between civil
servants with and without INSS coverage
Until 1988
1982 Created FINSOCIAL, currently COFINS Current
1988 Constitutional guarantee of social security rights Current (in part)
Source: MPAS (2002).
Notes: ISSB = Instituto de Serviços Sociais do Brasil, or Brazilian Social Service Institute;
IAP = Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensões, or Retirement Pension Institutes; LOPS =
Lei Orgânica da Previdência Social, or Organic Law of Social Security; PRORURAL = Prev-
idência do Trabalhador Rural; INPS = Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social, or National
Social Security Institute; FUNRURAL = Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural; INSS =
Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social, or National Institute of Social Insurance; FINSOCIAL
= Fundo de Investimento Social, or Social Investment Fund; COFINS = Contribuição para
o Financiamento da Seguridade Social, or Social Security Finance Contribution.
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Table 11-3 Evolution of Social Security Legislation (1989–2005)
Year Legislation Status
1989 Created CSLL Current
1990 Approved special pension regimes (RPP) for all
public-sector employees
Current
1991 Approved new financing and benefit laws Current (in part)
1993 Ended transfer of payroll tax resources for health Current
1993 Created financial transactions tax (CPMF) to
finance health expenditures
Current
1994 Created constitutional revision authorizing
transfer of social security funds
Until 2007
1996 Created a special tax regime for small- and
medium-sized businesses (SIMPLES)
Current
1998 Approved Constitutional Amendment 20 Current (in part)
1999 Created Social Security Factor (notional defined
accounts)
Current
1999 Created contribution for retired civil servants
(rejected by Supreme Court in 1999)
Current
2003 Approved Constitutional Amendment 41 (civil
servant pensions)
Current (in part)
2003 Lowered age for receiving old-age benefit via
LOAS from 67 years to 65 years
Current
2005 Social security revenue collected by the Treasury In transition
Source: MPAS (2000–5 editions).
Notes: CSLL = Contribuições sobre o Lucro Líquido, or Contribution over Liquid Profits;
RPP = Regime Próprio de Previdência; CPMF = Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimen-
tações Financeiras; LOAS = Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social, or social security law;
SIMPLES = Sistema Integrado de Pagamento de Impostos e Contribuições das Microem-
presas e Empresas de Pequeno Porte.
These legislative changes reflect a process of retrenchment of social
protection that is best understood within the context of the constitutional
reforms undertaken by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration
presented in Table 11-4. As in the rest of Latin America, Brazil was mov-
ing toward a greater role for the market, cost containment, and what
Pierson (2001: 425) refers to as ‘recalibration’ (adapting rules to new
constraints).
In the wake of Constitutional Amendment 20, which was passed in 1998
during the Cardoso administration and which some critics considered
too timid a reform, President Lula’s administration sought to reduce the
differences in civil service pensions and pensions for private-sector work-
ers covered by the Instituto Nacional de Seguro Social (INSS) (Berzoini
2003).
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Table 11-5 outlines these reforms and compares the situation before the
1998 Cardoso reforms and the changes proposed by President Lula in 2003.
Table 11-5 shows that the most important change was the possibility of
creating DC pension funds for new civil servants, which introduced an
important change with respect to pension funds in Brazil. Formal guar-
antees for these new workers would be limited to no more than the INSS
benefit ceiling. The new rules would eliminate parity between pensions and
active civil servants’ salaries for new workers, while maintaining parity for
those already receiving benefits,1 and would require current civil servants
to stay on the job until aged 60 years to avoid any reduction in pensions.
It is important to note that these new rules exempt military and police
pensions.
The creation of DC individual accounts was delayed. The regulations
for EC-41 were postponed in part due to the difficulty of financing the
transition costs in a climate of urgent fiscal adjustment. Disagreement over
how such a system would be organized was also politically contentious, since
contributions on retirement benefits would mean reduced pensions. The
process remains incomplete, and pension reform will no doubt continue
to be a significant policy challenge in the decades to come.
Structure and Coverage
In the section below, we describe the current state of Brazil’s pension
systems as well as key issues from current debates over reform.
Institutions and Benefits
The federal social security system, compulsory for all salaried workers and
optional for the self-employed, has two regimes:
 The General Social Security Regime, managed by the INSS and encom-
passing all urban and rural private-sector employees, employees in
government-owned firms, and the self-employed.
 The Statutory Social Security Regimes for Civil Servants, covering all federal
employees serving in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
(State and municipal employees have their own pension systems.)
Table 11-6 describes the main rules for eligibility and benefits in the special
pension regimes for civil servants. The ceiling for contributions and ben-
efits in the main system in 2007 was 2,802 reais equivalent to 7.6 times the
minimum monthly wage (US$1,381.50 in 2007). In other special programs,
the pension is equal to the worker’s final monthly wage, with no predefined
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ceiling. The floor benefit in both programs is 1 minimum monthly wage
(approximately US$181 in 2007).
The system also includes two supplemental regimes:
 Closed private pension programs (Entidades Fechadas de Previdência
Complementar, or EFPC) are for workers (or a category of workers)
in a given firm. The majority of these programs are DC. Supervision
is the responsibility of the Secretary of Supplemental Pensions of the
Ministry of Social Security (Secretaria de Previdência Complementar,
or SPC).
 Open complementary private pension programs (EAPC, or Entidades
Abertas de Previdência Complementar), also generally DC, are open
to any worker seeking supplemental retirement savings. Benefit levels
vary by plan and are under the supervision of the Superintendency of
Private Insurance (Superintendência de Seguros Privados, or SUSEP)
at the Ministry of Finance.
Table 11-7 summarizes these supplemental systems. Despite a relatively
low rate of worker participation, the capital invested in these funds is a
significant percentage of GDP given the relative concentration of income
in Brazil.
With the passage of Constitutional Amendment 20 in 1998, firms began
to contribute increasingly to open over closed pension funds. In 2005 open
Table 11-7 Indicators and Coverage of the EFPC and EAPC (December 2005)
Financial Indicators Closed (EFPC) Open (EAPC)
Funds as a percentage of GDPa 13.8 3.8
Contributors (millions) 1.73 6.08
Designated beneficiaries (thousands) 3.984 NA
Beneficiaries (thousands) 560 248
Contributors as a percentage of the economically
active population (EAP)
2.72 6.33
Designated beneficiaries as a percentage of the
EAP (IBGE)
4.73 NA
Beneficiaries as a percentage of total INSS
beneficiaries
2.65 1.18
Market share as percentage 69 31
Fund with highest market share (percentage) 25.9 41.7
Market share of largest 5 funds (percentage) 49.0 79.2
Sources: SPC (2006), SUSEP (2006), and IBGE (2007).
Note: IBGE = Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, or Brazilian Institute of Geog-
raphy and Statistics.
aGDP data are from the 2007 GDP data-set revision (see IBGE 2007).
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Table 11-8 Principal Benefits Offered by Closed Pension
Funds (2005)
Ordinary retirement 99%
Early retirement 43%
Disability 86%
Spousal pension 72%
Pensions for dependents 55%
Death benefit 41%
Vesting 67%
Source: Towers Perrin (2005).
funds received 31 percent of total employer contributions compared to 18
percent in 1994. Changes in income tax laws in 2002 provided an additional
stimulus for firms to contribute to open funds. However, despite the influx
of funds, the system continues to be characterized by a low density of
contributions, with very few workers drawing benefits.
Table 11-8 shows that closed pension funds offer a range of benefits
accessible after a vesting period, including the withdrawal of funds, that
somewhat resemble a traditional life insurance policy. Table 11-9 demon-
strates that replacement rates tend to be higher in closed funds for employ-
ees of state-owned firms and lower for other employees (especially in for-
eign firms).
In this respect, the coverage of the public systems and the closed comple-
mentary funds for workers in state-owned enterprises tend to offer better
guarantees than do other programs because they offer higher replacement
rates and are usually DB.
Financing Pensions
The question of how to finance the PAYGO pension programs has been
a major policy challenge. Some workers contribute regularly, but about
Table 11-9 Replacement Rate of Closed Pension Funds (2005)
Replacement Rate Private Firms
(National)
Private Firms
(Foreign Owned)
State-Owned
Firms
80–100% 20% 1% 38%
60–80% 26% 24% 26%
40–60% 24% 8% 12%
Up to 40% 2% 1% —
Source: Towers Perrin (2005).
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50 percent of the working population, including rural workers, domestic
employees, and workers in the informal urban economy, generally do
not. The financing arrangements established in the 1988 Constitution
are intended to compensate for workers’ differing abilities to contribute
by redistributing funds collected by levies on a broader revenue base. It
classified the heterogeneous conditions of each benefit as:
 conditions of a contributive character, such as retirement based on
time of contribution, which does not tend to involve transferring funds
between generations;
 conditions of a partially contributive character, such as retirement by
age, which requires a certain degree of redistribution of funds between
generations; and
 conditions of a universal nature, such as welfare benefits, which do not
call for contributions and have an explicitly redistributive character.
The system for funding health, welfare, and social security benefits reflects
this mix of contribution-based and universal benefits.2 The sources of funds
for social security are captive, and based on four principal sources (see
Table 11-10). The Constitution requires that a specific budget be drawn
up, distinct from the federal fiscal budget, with exclusive sources of funds
to finance social security.3 Over time, the social security budget has also
begun to receive revenue collected on financial transactions.4
In the civil servants’ systems, employees must contribute a minimum of
11 percent of their wages. Their employers (federal, state, and municipal
governments) contribute up to 11 percent or more, depending on the
region, and must cover the difference between what is collected and spent
on benefits.
Closed pension plans are increasingly moving from DB to DC systems.
In 1994 43 percent of the closed plans were either DC or mixed systems
with both DC and DB. By 2004, 89 percent of the funds were straight DC
or mixed. Employers were beginning to shoulder less of the administrative
costs. In 2000, 8 percent of affiliated employees paid administrative fees on
closed pension funds, while by 2004 that figure had risen to 17 percent.
Coverage and Contributors: The Origin
of the Problem
The principal source of the financial disequilibrium in Brazil is that ben-
efit coverage for senior citizens is nearly universal, while the total num-
ber of workers contributing to the system is quite limited. This trend
becomes clear in Table 11-11, which compares coverage levels among per-
sons aged 60 years or older with the economically active population and
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Table 11-10 Sources of Financing for Social Security Expenditures
Contribution Levying Base Rate
Contributions from
employees
Gross wages up to a
ceiling of
approximately 10
CWs
7.65% to 1 CW, 8.65% from 1
CW to 3 CWs, 9% from 3 to
5 CWs, 11% from 5 to 10
CWs
Contributions by
employers
Payroll 20% over the total, 1–3% to
cover labor accidents, 15%
when contracting
self-employed workers
Contributions by
self-employed workers
Income up to the
ceiling of 10 CWs
20% over the class of income,
subdivided into multiples
of the CW, limited by the
INSS floor and ceiling
(11% for 1 CW)
Contributions by special
rural, fishing and
mining contributors
(family economies)
Revenue from sales 2% plus 0.1% to cover labor
accidents
Contribution for
financing social
security (COFINS)
Companies’ monthly
sales
7.6% for companies in
general (financial
institutions are exempted)
Contribution on
companies’ net
profits (CSLL)
Companies’ net profit 8% for companies in general
and 18% for financial
institutions
Funding from the
federal government
(National Treasury)
Fiscal budget Depending on the need for
financing
Income from lotteries Net income 60% of all weekly revenue
Provisional contribution
on financial
transactions (CPMF)
Bank operations (with
some exemptions)
0.38% on each transaction,
0.2% for health care, 0.1%
to the INSS, and 0.08% to
antipoverty programs
Integrated system for
paying taxes and
labor obligations by
very small and small
companies
(SIMPLES)a
Sales by very small
companies
(minimum 5%) and
small companies (up
to 10%)
2–2.7% (depending on sales)
as contribution of
employers on payroll, 2%
as COFINS, and 1% as
CSLL
Other income Income from bonds and
securities or real
estate
Depends on the earnings of
each security, bond, or
rental or sale of real estate
Sources: Law 8.212/91, updated by Constitutional Amendment 20/98 and Law 9.876/99.
Note: CW = contribution wages.
aThe SIMPLES (tax) system replaces the COFINS.
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Table 11-11 Benefit Coverage via Social Security Income Transfers (as % of
Total Population)
Population Coverage 1981–4 1985–9 1990–3 1995–8 1999–2002 2003–4
Economically active 39.2 38.4 36.3 32.6 32.7 34.1
Family dependents 65.0 63.5 61.2 56.3 54.7 54.6
Old age (60 years+) 50.1 56.3 67.6 76.7 77.5 77.7
Source: IBGE.
Notes: Table does not include Bolsa Família (family allowance benefit). No data for 1991,
1994, and 2000.
their dependents. Direct coverage for individuals aged 60 years and older
has tended to increase in recent years, while coverage for the other 2 groups
has stagnated.
The coverage of those aged 60 years or older is high and increases with
age. For instance, in 2001 70 percent of the population aged 65–69 years
received a benefit, and an additional 20.8 percent of the population was
covered through a family member. For those aged 70–74 years, those figures
were 75.9 and 20 percent, respectively, according to Cordero (2005).
At older ages, coverage reaches very high levels—although not universal,
it is nearly so. In recent studies, both the ILO and the World Bank have
pointed to Brazil as an exemplary case with respect to coverage. However,
the same cannot be said about the risks that affect current workers and their
dependents; less than two-thirds of this population is covered and coverage
rates remain low. As more workers enter the informal sector, the number of
families with at least one member contributing to social security continues
to decline. If this trend is not reversed, the system will experience growing
costs and greater inequality.
Differing Diagnoses: Financing and
Social Conditions
There is a wide-ranging debate over what actions are necessary to achieve
pension reform in Brazil, a debate complicated by the lack of consensus
about the reliability of basic social indicators. Issues in the debate range
from the effectiveness of income transfers to the degree to which deficits
or surpluses justify reform measures.
Social Conditions, Targeting, and Seguridade
Pension payments play an increasingly important role in reducing poverty
for families with income below 50 percent of the per capita minimum
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salary. In 1992 49 percent of all Brazilian families would have had income
below the poverty line if not for INSS payments that reduced the figure to
42 percent. There was a dramatic improvement by 2003, when 43 percent
of families were below the poverty line without INSS payments and 32
percent were below after receiving benefits (according to Paiva, Passos, and
Ansiliero 2005, based on IBGE data).
Despite the effectiveness of the INSS as an antipoverty program, if its
purpose is to reduce poverty, then its benefits could be targeted more
effectively. INSS benefit levels are linked to the minimum wage, but since
only 30 percent of beneficiaries are below the poverty line, raising the
minimum wage is not the most efficient way to target the poor. A 40-real
increase in the Bolsa Família (family allowance), which benefits families
in both the formal and informal sectors, would have the same poverty-
reducing impact as a 10 percent hike in the minimum wage at two-thirds
of the cost according to Barros and Carvalho (2005). Raising the mini-
mum wage is not an effective way to combat poverty, they say, because
the retired already receive an elevated level of income transfers, making
it more effective to (a) transfer income to the poorest segments of the
population, reducing retirement payments to the minimum level, and
(b) raise Bolsa Família benefits for families with children up to 14 years
old.
One element often overlooked in Brazil’s social debate is the link
between the 1988 Constitution and poverty reduction. The Constitution
preserves (in part) the value of benefits, which has reduced the incidence
of indigence and poverty among the elderly. Dain and Lavinas (2005)
report that indigence among those older than 65 years fell from 3 percent
in 1981 to 1 percent in 2003, while the absolute number of those older than
60 years living in extreme poverty fell by half. As Lavinas (2006) notes, when
a benefit is not considered a ‘right’, the poor and indigent are not always
identified because, beyond meeting the necessary requirements, they often
lack information or voice (many of the poor lack required documents or
even a postal address).
Targeted income transfer programs can generate inefficiencies, and not
all of those eligible ultimately receive benefits. The recently launched
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD, a national house-
hold survey) reveals that food security assistance reached only 18 million
of 45 million households facing food insecurity. The PNAD survey also
demonstrates that among indigent families with an income of 25 percent
of the minimum wage or less, half have not applied for assistance. In other
words, the coverage deficit is the largest in the most vulnerable groups.
It is apparent that in Brazil, with its weak state capacity, profound social
inequality, and large numbers of poor individuals with low education levels,
targeting does not reach the most needy.5
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Financing, Spending, and Long-Term Equilibrium
Many analysts suggest that reform efforts since 1993, while significant, have
been insufficient, given projected actuarial shortfalls that could have grave
macroeconomic implications in the future. Furthermore, the growing INSS
deficits and rising expenditures on public servant pensions have brought
on a fiscal crisis that has led to public spending being increasingly directed
toward benefits rather than investment.
Giambiagi et al. (2004) demonstrate that the differences between rev-
enue collection and expenditures are growing. Even though the deficit has
grown faster for civil servants (because there is no specific contribution for
the employer), INSS expenditures have expanded at an even faster rate
(see Table 11-12).
Generous rules guiding benefits also contribute to financial shortfalls.
According to the World Bank (2001) and Giambiagi et al. (2004), the
relatively high value and long duration of pensions granted based on time
of contribution are especially costly. Giambiagi et al. argue further that non-
contributory pensions are relatively ineffective social policies that create a
vicious cycle due to their high cost, which leads to high payroll taxes that in
turn provide an incentive for joining the informal sector.
From this perspective, the solution is to adopt new constitutional reforms
to guarantee benefits proportional to contributions and to avoid unre-
stricted spending on noncontributory benefits. Table 11-13 presents poten-
tial financial scenarios according to differing reforms, GDP growth, and
minimum wages.
Giambiagi et al. (2004) say that reforms are necessary to contain costs,
which could reach 10 percent of GDP, assuming moderate economic
growth and a continued rise in the real value of the minimum wage.
The authors point to acceleration in growth in assistance and time-of-
contribution benefits, which will lead to worsening deficits unless a reform
is enacted. The proposed reforms project that expenditures would fall
to 6.9 percent of GDP assuming 3 percent annual GDP growth, and 5.6
percent of GDP with an annual GDP growth of 4 percent.
There are different perspectives on the link between the financial crisis
and the reform process. According to Dain (2003) and ANFIP (2005),
the 1988 Constitution requires that taxes on corporate earnings (COFINS,
or Contribuição Social para Financiamento da Seguridade Social), prof-
its (CSLL, or Contribuições sobre o Lucro Líquido), and payroll taxes
were intended to finance pensions, health, and social assistance. Since the
constitutional reform of 1993–4, the government has diverted more than
20 percent of COFINS, CSLL, and CPMF (Contribuição Provisória sobre
Movimentação Financeira, literally ‘temporary contribution on financial
transactions’) to other expenditures (see Table 11-14), and was authorized
to do so through 2007. Critics argue that this practice deviates from the
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Table 11-13 INSS Expenditure Projections Measured (as a % of GDP)
Scenario without Reform Scenario with Reforma
Minimum Wage
Indexed to
Inflation
Minimum Wage Grows at
Same Rate as Growth in
Per Capita GDP
GDP 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0
2005 7.8 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7
2030 9.2 7.4 10.0 8.4 6.9 5.6
Source: Giambiagi et al. (2004: 34), based on data from the IBGE and Ministry of Social
Security.
aGiambiagi et al. (2004) assume a minimum retirement age 55 years in 2010 and 65 years in
2025. During this period, the retirement age difference between men and women would be
gradually reduced. In 2025, women would have a retirement age of 63 years with 33 years of
required contributions. In addition, special benefits for preschool through middle-school
teachers would be eliminated. Finally, the minimum benefit would be adjusted only for
inflation. Old-age social assistance benefits would be set at 80% of the minimum pension
and unlinked from the minimum wage, and granted at age 70 rather than at age 65, as is
currently the case.
original 1988 Constitution, arguing that if all revenues had been spent on
social security, revenues would have exceeded benefits, generating a huge
surplus. In short, from this perspective, the INSS was not the source of the
growing deficit.6
Others argue that these revenue losses occurred due to nonpayment of
taxes, evasion, and fraud (see Table 11-15), facilitated by weak enforce-
ment (ANFIP 2005). Revenue collection could be dramatically improved
Table 11-14 Annual Social Security Budget (as a % of GDP)a
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Revenue 7.6 7.7 8.3 8.3 9.1 10.1 10.4 10.7 10.4 11.4 11.6 11.9
INSS 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.5
COFINS 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.0 4.1 3.9
CPMF — — 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
CSLL 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2
Expenditures 7.1 6.9 7.0 7.5 7.7 7.8 8.2 8.2 8.5 8.9 9.4 9.9
Pension (INSS) 4.9 5.2 5.1 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.9 7.2
Health (SUS) 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7
Social assistance 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0
Surplus 0.6 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.4 2.2 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.0
Sources: ANFIP (2007), based on data from the Ministries of Finance and Planning; IBGE
(2007).
Note: SUS = Sistema Único de Saúde.
aGDP data are from the 2007 GDP data-set revision (IBGE 2007).
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Table 11-15 Potential Social Security Revenue Collection (as a % of GDP, Rev.
2007 Data)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nonpayment (a) 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Fraud (b) 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8
Evasion total (c = a + b) 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2
Exempt (d) 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6
Revenue collection (e) 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.0
Potential revenue
collection ( f = b + d + e)
7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.7 7.4
Estimated losses
(g = f − e)
2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4
Source: ANFIP (2007).
Note: Deflator: National Consumer Price Index (INPC—Indice nacional dos preços ao
consumidor).
through increased compliance. Critics also argue that the granting of con-
tribution exemptions, such as those given to philanthropic organizations
and exporters, is questionable, given the fact that benefits are linked to
contributions.
Note that policy assessments described in this section need to be viewed
with caution, given the fact that they often rely on contradictory and erro-
neous data. Meanwhile, spending continues to rise, while average benefits
do not satisfy basic needs. Policymakers face a clear agenda of improving
the efficiency and equity of benefits while at the same time creating better
conditions for business, investors, and labor.
Conclusions and Suggestions for an Alternative
Agenda
Since the regional trend toward individual accounts took off in the 1990s,
Brazil’s path toward social security reform has differed significantly from
that of its neighbors, focusing on universalizing benefit coverage and para-
metric reforms in the PAYGO public system rather than structural reform.
As described above, policies in recent years have been shaped by the range
of social protection codified in the 1988 Constitution, and the process of
social security reform has required investments of tremendous political
capital in order to amend the Constitution.
One conclusion that can be drawn from examining current debates in
Brazil is that the immediate policy challenges of improving equity and
efficiency can be met not only via constitutional reform, but, in the shorter
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Table 11-16 Occupations as Proportion of the Workforce and Salaries in
Selected Countries
Country Wages and
Payroll/
GDP—2002
Occupational Structure 2002 Average Wage
in Euros
(2001)aEmployers and
Self-Employed
Salaried
Workers
Domestic
Household
Workers
Brazil 36.1 30.0 61.3 8.7 5,138
Portugal 60.4 25.4 72.7 1.8 13,338
Spain 65.5 17.5 80.6 1.8 17,432
France 66.9 9.7 89.2 1.1 27,319
Germany 68.9 10.0 88.9 1.1 38,204
United Kingdom 65.2 11.4 88.1 0.3 37,677
Sweden 74.8 10.2 89.3 0.5 31,620
Eurozone 64.4 14.8 83.2 1.9 29,627
Sources: IBGE (2003), OECD (2003), and Eurostat (2003).
aTen and more employees.
term through administrative reform, and improved regulatory and man-
agerial performance.
Low levels of coverage for affiliates remain a basic problem in Brazil
and the rest of Latin America (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2004: 273–5).7
Without higher salary levels, a largely formal and salaried labor sector, and
a high density of contributions, social security benefits cannot provide a
basic standard of living, nor is it possible to have a classic universal social
security system functioning with an actuarial equilibrium based on a social
insurance model (see Table 11-16).
With respect to current laws, changing survivorship rules and regulations
would reap clear savings. In Brazil, lifetime survivorship benefits are given
indiscriminately without regard to the age of the spouse, number of chil-
dren in the family, or length of the marriage.8 Such permissive benefits
would be considered quite generous in the industrialized world, but seem
altogether out of place in a developing country like Brazil (Coutinho and
Ribeiro 2006).9 In Sweden, for example, able-bodied workers are eligible
for a universal survivor pension payable for 6 months after 5 years of
marriage, or for as long as the survivor is caring for a child younger than
12 years. Sweden’s six-month survivor pension stands in sharp contrast
to the situation in Brazil, where even a young adult capable of working
automatically receives lifetime benefits (see Table 11-17).
A similar principle exists with respect to disability: those capable of
working should be expected to do so. However, in Brazil, nearly all of
those classified as temporarily or permanently disabled are considered
11-Kay-and-Sinha-c11 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 306 of 316 August 20, 2007 17:40
306 Milko Matijascic and Stephen J. Kay
Table 11-17 Comparison of Survivor Benefits in Select Countries
Country Requirements Benefit Termination
Mexico 150 weeks of
contribution
Private: 90% of the
value of the disability
pension
Public: 90% of insured’s
pension (both for
widow or dependent
disabled widower)
Remarriage: 3-year
lump sum
USA 6 of 13 quarters
coverage prior
to death
100% at retirement age,
payable to widow(er)
after minimum 10
years of marriage,
75% if disabled or
caring for a child
under aged 16
Age 18 for orphan
children in school.
Survivor retains
pension if remarries
after 60
Sweden 3-year residence Maximum is 90%
reduced base amount,
40% of earnings
related pension (both
for 6 months). Special
survivor benefit if
survivor ill or
unemployed
Until dependent child
is aged 12
Italy 5 years
contributions,
3 in 5 prior to
death
60% of insured’s
pension, 100% for
spouse + 2 children,
Income test if granted
after September 1995
New marriage or age
of majority
Portugal Deceased met
pension
requirements
60% of insured’s
pension
5 years unless
surviving spouse
over 35 years of age,
disabled, or caring
for a child
Brazil 12 months of
contribution
100% for spouses or
dependents and up to
20% for orphans
through age 16 (or 24
if in school). The
pension is for life,
regardless of age
Remarriage
Sources: Social Security Administration (2002, 2004).
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totally disabled. Appropriately classifying partially disabled workers would
encourage those who are capable of work to find suitable employment.
Another indicator that Brazil’s disability pensions are alarmingly and
disproportionately high is that expenditures associated with risk (disability
and survival pensions) have remained steady for twenty-five years, despite
the fact that the aged population has grown—and, since the constitutional
amendment of 1988, has enjoyed more generous benefits. Under these
circumstances, we would expect old-age pensions to increase as a propor-
tion of overall pension expenditures. Nevertheless, disability and survival
pensions only fell from 38.2 percent of expenditures from 1980 through
1984 to 34.8 percent of expenditures between 2000 and 2004.
Furthermore, many workers continue to be formally employed even
while drawing pensions, a situation commonly justified by low benefits.
Seniors are thought to have no choice but to return to work. Since 1981 the
number of beneficiaries of retirement and survivorship pensions who are
employed has increased, due not only to Brazil’s rapid population growth
(from 110 million in 1981 to approximately 180 million in 2004) and eco-
nomic crises, but also because of the large number of people who sought
early retirement ahead of the Cardoso administration’s pension reforms. A
growing number of these beneficiaries found employment in the informal
sector, as the percentage of employed pensioners not contributing to the
pension system expanded (see Table 11-18). Retired persons with lower
benefits are less likely to be employed, while retirees receiving higher
average benefits are more likely to be employed and to contribute to social
security.
The general argument for permitting individuals to have multiple ben-
efits is this: because benefit levels are so low to begin with, people should
justifiably be able to accumulate more than one pension. However, that
Table 11-18 Retired and Survivor Pensioners’ Work Status (% for Selected
Years)
Beneficiaries Retirement Benefit Survivorship Benefit
1981 1990 1995 2004 1981 1990 1995 2004
Retired (not seeking
employment)
80.9 76.9 65.2 67.0 73.5 72.4 66.5 70.7
Retired and unemployed 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.6 2.0
Employed and a contributor
to pension system
6.4 6.2 6.4 6.0 14.0 13.0 11.2 8.9
Employed and a
noncontributor
12.6 16.7 27.8 26.2 11.0 13.8 20.8 18.4
Source: IBGE (PNAD) (2004).
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individuals receiving higher benefits tend to have multiple sources of
income while those with lower benefits do not suggest that permitting
multiple benefits leads to a higher concentration of income.
Although the population that retires relatively young and enjoys multiple
benefits is significant, the vast majority receive only the minimum pension.
The existence of this enormous population living in poverty raises the
question of the effectiveness of targeting or lowering the benefit floor.
Faced with a somewhat similar situation in Chile, the 2006 presidential
advisory commission took a different approach to addressing the role of
pensions in addressing poverty when it recommended a ‘solidarity’ pillar
that would reach the bottom 60 percent of earners (Consejo 2006).
Policymaking is clearly hampered by the absence of accurate data, which
is exemplified by conflicting data on worker mortality for those receiving
benefits based on thirty years of contributions (these conditions are more
typically met by workers in better remunerated jobs). Mortality is, of course,
a key indicator for determining the duration of benefits and for projecting
program costs. However, although workers tend to retire at relatively young
ages in Brazil, the duration of benefits does not in itself appear to be the
key problem for the private-sector workers pension system. Using Social
Security Ministry data (from the DATAPREV database; see MPAS 2005),
Table 11-19 shows that the average age when benefits are granted rose from
50 years for men and 48 years for women in 1997 to 54.8 years and 51.7
years in 2005, while the average age of cessation of benefits (i.e. death of
beneficiaries) was 71.3/66.3 years.
The age at which benefits cease due to death is actually lower than overall
average life expectancy, according to the 2004 government mortality tables,
which show benefits ceasing at age 77.7 years for men and 80.8 years for
women (after being granted at ages 55 and 52 years, respectively) (IBGE
2004). Comparing these numbers to the Ministry of Social Security num-
bers reveals a 6.6-year disparity for men and a 14.4-year disparity for women.
This discrepancy exemplifies the lack of reliable indicators in Brazil, an
especially serious problem for forecasting the long-term financing needs of
the pension system.10
Some analysts emphasize the critical importance of raising the retire-
ment age (Giambiagi et al. 2004), although retirement systems throughout
the world permit early retirement in return for reduced benefits. However,
as Table 11-20 shows, the issue in Brazil has more to do with high replace-
ment rates relative to overall worker contributions. Furthermore, it has
been possible since 1998 to alter how benefit formulas are calculated via
ordinary law. This is not the case with raising the retirement age, which
requires the very cumbersome process of constitutional reform. At the
same time, 68 percent of the EAP and 44 percent of the working-age labor
force work in occupations where social rights and legal protections are
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Table 11-20 Average Age, Legal Age, and Replacement Rates for Retirement
Pensions in 2001
Retirement Pensions
by Country and Type
Average Retirement
Age (Years)
Legal Retirement
Age (Years)
Benefit as
a Percentage
of Salary
Men Women
Brazil (TC) 53.7 65 60 88/92a
France 58.7 60 60 75
Italy 60.4 65 60 65
Brazil (TC + urban, by age) 60.8 65 60 91/74b
Spain 61.4 65 65 65
Germany 61.6 65 65 75
Sweden 63.2 65 65 NA
United Kingdom 63.2 65 65 48
Portugal 64.5 65 65 54
Sources: MPAS (2001), IBGE (2001b), and Eurostat (2003); 2004 figures for Brazil INSS
(excluding the special regimes).
Note: TC = time of contribution.
aCompared to salaried contributors. Figures come from two different sources (MPAS 2001
cites 92%; IBGE 2001b cites 88%).
b Compared to the employed workforce. Figures come from two different sources (MPAS
2001 cites 91% and IBGE 2001b cites 74%).
not respected (IBGE 2001b). The cost of the generous pensions enjoyed
by a small percentage of retired workers is borne by that relatively small
portion of the labor force that contributes at very high rates, which in turn
encourages increased evasion.
The evasion problem could be solved with the adoption of a zero pil-
lar/tier that pays a basic benefit to all workers, regardless of total contribu-
tions for old age. This kind of minimum income benefit could be comple-
mented with a pension based on a classical social insurance scheme with DB
and calculated strictly according to the effective contributions. For workers
preferring higher income during retirement, market solutions including
DC plans and voluntary saving could be encouraged. Such a scheme would
be feasible with much lower contribution rates and an actuarially accurate
formula that fixes replacement rates according to international standards.
This solution would cover the needs of the retired without encouraging
early retirement and the accumulation of multiple pensions by middle-class
workers.
In coping with these challenges, it is important to emphasize that the
lengthy process of constitutional reform is not the only nor necessarily the
most effective method to reform social security and bring financial stability.
Parametric reforms, including administrative measures, play an important
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role and could bring faster and more immediate results. Administrative
reforms can present an effective financial solution without the political
challenges of amending the Constitution.
Administrative measures could include:
 Eliminating risk-based benefits for those who do not need them. Par-
tially disabled workers can continue to work in some capacity.
 Verifying more diligently disability status and ceasing total disability
status for those capable of working.
 Preventing disability through better monitoring of workplace safety.
The following measures could be taken via ordinary legislative reforms:
 Imposing restrictions on receiving one or more pension benefits while
still receiving wages from employment.
 In granting death benefits, considering the presence or absence of
minor children and the capacity of survivors to be employed.
 Granting partial disability status when appropriate.
Arguments that Brazil’s social expenditures are elevated given its stage of
development (see Giambiagi et al. 2004) should be viewed with caution.
Although Brazil’s population is relatively young compared to European
countries, its population is aging at a faster rate (UN 2004). As the rate
of economic growth has slowed, income transfers have increased fiscal
pressure. Table 11-21 suggests that Brazilian spending on old-age pensions
could be considered relatively low compared to that in Mexico, which has
a higher rate of growth, and the USA, which has a social protection system
that assigns a greater role to the market and individual initiative.
As Gillion et al. (2000) point out, any analysis of social spending must
consider total spending and not just public-sector expenditures. Spending
should be viewed according to the age profile of the population to assess
the level of spending with respect to the covered population. Such an
exercise suggests that public expenditures on survivorship benefits in Brazil
(3.1% of GDP) are overly generous (see Table 11-21). The rapid rise in
spending on disability benefits and family income support in a population
where fewer workers are contributing is also cause for concern.11 Policy-
makers may wish to devote greater attention toward reforming rules over
survivorship benefits.
Furthermore, the lack of integration among health, welfare, and pen-
sion policies creates duplication and waste, as does weak administration,
which results in fraud. Operational costs (including personnel expendi-
tures) in Brazil represent a relatively high 3.7 percent of total benefits.12
Furthermore, up to 20 percent of benefits contain ‘irregularities’, and it is
projected that annual losses are equivalent to 15 percent of total revenue
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due to improper revenue collection and benefit payments. Because of these
inefficiencies, elevated tax rates place an onerous burden on families and
firms, stifling potential economic growth.13
Resolving these administrative and legislative challenges could facilitate
political support for new constitutional reforms. Brazil’s 1988 Constitution
raised the benefit floor and facilitated access to benefits for the needy.
Social security pensions were the primary government social program and
played a key role in reducing poverty. As discussed above, significant steps
can be taken to reduce overall pension expenditures in Brazil, primarily
through addressing the benefits that are exceptionally generous by inter-
national standards without reducing basic benefits, which play a critical
antipoverty role.
It is clear that the process of administrative and legislative reform at
the subconstitutional level should be accelerated. It is also apparent, given
the current distribution of benefits, that the pension system cannot be
sustained by payroll taxes alone and that a strong basic antipoverty benefit
is necessary given the significant number of workers earning wages at or
close to the minimum wage. The creation of reserves or a system of par-
tial capitalization could contribute to easing demographic transitions and
stimulate market-led investment—which could also broaden the market
for complementary pension funds geared toward professionals. However,
any such reforms require transparency and must be done in such a way to
minimize both risks and administrative costs.
Notes
1 In July 2004 the Supreme Court ruled that retired civil servants have to con-
tribute 11% of their pensions on the amount exceeding the INSS ceiling and that
survivor benefits be reduced by 30% below the covered worker’s retirement benefit
only for pensions above the ceiling. Otherwise, civil servants would receive benefits
lower than those of workers in the INSS even though contribution rates would be
the same.
2 Law 8.213 provides that civil and military federal, state, and municipal employees
covered by specific statutes are exempt from paying into social security. Expendi-
tures on these pensions were are not part of the OSS seguridade budget that encom-
passes all the federal government’s expenditures on health care, social assistance,
and pension coverage, but were later added. OSS coverage of non-pension related
expenditures was originally an interim measure, but will likely be extended.
3 As mentioned above, the constitutional reform of 1994 allowed the administra-
tion to reallocate 20% of revenue to other areas.
4 The provisional financial transactions tax (the CPMF) was introduced to help
fund health-care expenditures when the resources that had been provided by pay-
roll taxes or collected by the INSS were no longer directed toward health care.
5 According to Lavinas (2006), among the poorest 10% of the population, 37% are
single heads of households with children, with a median monthly family income of
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12 reais, compared to 24 reais for 2-parent families (comprising 48% of the poorest
10%). Of these single-parent families, two-thirds are not covered by any type of
income transfer compared to 50% of 2-parent families.
6 The economic difficulties of the 1990s led to higher unemployment and infor-
mality, which led to a reduction in payroll tax revenue for financing social security.
This ultimately led to a rise in taxes on profits, earnings, and financial transactions.
7 Gill et al. (2005) see a positive correlation between higher income levels, the
number of regular contributors, and contribution density. The authors point out,
however, that coverage rates vary widely among countries with similar levels of
income. This suggests that other factors, such as confidence in institutions or
market incentives, can play an important role. The authors foresee an active role
for government in reducing poverty levels among senior citizens.
8 Benefits end upon remarriage.
9 A court decision even permitted a woman to receive two state-funded survivor-
ship pensions: one from her son and the other from her husband (Diário de São
Paulo 2005).
10 Furthermore, note that survivorship pension benefits are not taken into con-
sideration when calculating the social security factor (described above). Because
there is no minimum age to qualify for a benefit, the payout period can last for
several decades. In fact, DATAPREV data does not include information on the
duration of benefits or even the average age of the beneficiary. The lack of an INSS
mortality table and the failure to include survivor pensions leads to gross errors
and erroneous diagnoses based on inadequate data. Consequently, any financial
projections using these assumptions are questionable, if not useless.
11 Assembling crossnational indicators is complicated given differences in coverage,
income supports, and the mix between private and public provision. These indica-
tors serve as a reference to evaluate spending levels, which in turn can affect public
finance and international competitiveness.
12 Administrative costs of 3.7% of benefits are higher than in other countries. In the
USA, administrative costs in 1992 were 0.7%; in Switzerland, 0.8%; in Japan, 0.3%;
and in Italy, 3.4% (WB 1994: 312).
13 Upon his resignation in March 2005, Social Security Minister Amir Lando argued
that current benefits needed to be audited and that social security records should
be compared with income tax and health records. Finance Minister Antônio Palocci
later stated that reducing social security fraud and evasion would enable the gov-
ernment to increase the primary fiscal surplus without resorting to a constitutional
reform of the pension system (see Agencia O Globo 2005).
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